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Reference: https://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Paravirtualization_(PV) https://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Xen_VGA_Passthrough https://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Xen_PCI_Passthrough [[文件:File-XenPV.png|100px|right]] Terminology fullvirtualization: no modifications to the hosted operating system paravirtualization: requires modifications to the operating system MFN (machine frame number): real host machine address GPFN (guest pseudoframe number): Guests run in an illusory contiguous physical address space (但实际可能不连续) GMFN (guest machine frame number): PFN (physical frame number) SPT (shadow page table) HVM: Hardware Virtual Machine, which is the full-virtualization mode supported by Xen. PV support is provided by the paravirt operations extensions (PVOPS) and PV front and back-end drivers that are shipped with Linux. Xen Project Guest (DomU) support for Linux was introduced into the Linux kernel with version 2.6.24 Xen Project Control Domain (Dom0) support was added from version 2.6.37. The key drivers have been added to Linux v 3.0 and since additional drivers and optimizations are added. backend driver = driver required in the Xen dom0 kernel frontend driver = driver required in the Xen domU guest kernel pciback and pcifront = drivers required for PCI passthrough. These drivers are not related to using PCI devices in dom0! usbback and usbfront = drivers required for USB passthrough. These drivers are not related to using physical usb devices in dom0! scsiback and scsifront = drivers required for PVSCSI passthrough. These drivers are not related to using SCSI devices in dom0! *Xen VGA graphics adapter passthrough requires IOMMU (Intel VT-d) support from the motherboard chipset, from the motherboard BIOS and from Xen. VGA 需要bios, 但DomU没有bios, 所以这个需要bios 有虚拟化支持 . Note that some graphics cards might work in the PV domU just by using the normal Xen PCI passthru. 新的图形卡应该直接看PCI passthru. *PCI 穿越 Dom0 发现pci device 把它连接给 pciback driver. DomU 由 QEMU 模拟的 PCI bus 上找到 device 把它跟 pcifront river连接. 安全问题: VM buggy驱动可能损害别的系统. 可由VM 攻击其他系统 . 解法:IOMMU - (1)允许Xen限制device 可access 的memory. (2) allows Xen to give the device the same virtualized memory layout that the guest sees. Dom 0 Load 方法: (1) Static assignment for built-in xen-pciback: dom0 kernel command line: xen-pciback.hide=(08:00.0)(08.00.1)(device to passthru) (2) dynamic load: Dom0 console: modprobe xen-pciback xl pci-assignable-add <domain>:<bus>:<slot>.<function> Guest configuration: guest kernel command-line iommu=soft #pvops kernel swiotlb=force #classic Xen kernel vm create configue file pci=['80:00.0',<domain>:<bus>:<slot>.<function>,...] on Dom0 console command line xl pci-attach <domain-id> <pci device> <guest virtual slot number> xl pci-detach <domain-id> <pci device> <guest virtual slot number> *Paravirtualised Memory Management Reference: https://wiki.xen.org/wiki/X86_Paravirtualised_Memory_Management Direct Paging: VM 直接写 machine address mapping The Xen paravirtualised MMU model instead requires that the guest be aware of the P2M mapping and be modified such that instead of writing page table entries mapping virtual addresses to the (pseudo-)physical address space it would instead write entries mapping virtual addresses directly to the machine address space by mapping performing the mapping from pseudo physical to machine addresses itself using the P2M as it writes its page tables. Page Type: LN Page table page Pages used as a page table at level N. There are separate types for each of the 4 levels on 64-bit and 3 levels on 32-bit PAE guests. Segment descriptor page Pages used as part of the Global or Local Descriptor tables (GDT/LDT). Writeable Page is writable. long HYPERVISOR_mmu_update() update page table entry (PTE) long HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping() HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op() The Physical-to-machine (P2M) machine-to-physical mapping tables (M2P) Interrupt Descriptor Table: guest 只能看到virtual IDT Global/Local Descriptor Tables: A Xen guest is not able to access. read-only in the guest. Virtual Address Space 0x0000000000000000-0x00007fffffffffff Fully available to guests 0x0000800000000000-0xffff7fffffffffff Inaccessible (addresses are 48-bit sign extended) <font color=#0000FF>0xffff800000000000-0xffff807fffffffff Read only to guests.</font> 0xffff808000000000-0xffff87ffffffffff Reserved for Xen use 0xffff880000000000-0xffffffffffffffff Fully Available to guests For 32-bit guests running on a 64-bit hypervisor guests the virtual address space under 4G (which is all such guests can access is: 0x00000000-0xf57fffff Fully available to guests 0xf5800000-0xffffffff Read only to guests. *gnttab Grant Tables Xen's grant tables provide a generic mechanism to memory sharing between domains. Each domain has its own grant table. grant reference is an integer, which indexes into the grant table. Linux source: drivers/xen/grant_table.c <source lang="c"> gnttab_init gnttab_grant_foreign_access_ref gnttab_grant_foreign_access gnttab_query_foreign_access gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref gnttab_end_foreign_access gnttab_grant_foreign_transfer gnttab_grant_foreign_transfer_ref gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref gnttab_end_foreign_transfer gnttab_free_grant_reference gnttab_free_grant_references gnttab_alloc_grant_references gnttab_empty_grant_references gnttab_claim_grant_reference gnttab_release_grant_reference gnttab_request_free_callback gnttab_cancel_free_callback gnttab_max_grant_frames gnttab_setup_auto_xlat_frames gnttab_free_auto_xlat_frames gnttab_alloc_pages gnttab_free_pages gnttab_batch_map gnttab_batch_copy gnttab_foreach_grant_in_range gnttab_map_refs gnttab_unmap_refs gnttab_unmap_refs_async gnttab_unmap_refs_sync static const struct gnttab_ops gnttab_v1_ops = { .map_frames = gnttab_map_frames_v1, .unmap_frames = gnttab_unmap_frames_v1, .update_entry = gnttab_update_entry_v1, .end_foreign_access_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1, .end_foreign_transfer_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref_v1, .query_foreign_access = gnttab_query_foreign_access_v1, }; </source> - Introducing a valid entry into the grant table: 1. Write ent->domid. 2. Write ent->frame: GTF_permit_access: Frame to which access is permitted. GTF_accept_transfer: Pseudo-phys frame slot being filled by new frame, or zero if none. 3. Write memory barrier (WMB). 4. Write ent->flags, inc. valid type. - Invalidating an unused GTF_permit_access entry: 1. flags = ent->flags. 2. Observe that !(flags & (GTF_reading|GTF_writing)). 3. Check result of SMP-safe CMPXCHG(&ent->flags, flags, 0). NB. No need for WMB as reuse of entry is control-dependent on success of step 3, and all architectures guarantee ordering of ctrl-dep writes. - Invalidating an in-use GTF_permit_access entry: This cannot be done directly. Request assistance from the domain controller which can set a timeout on the use of a grant entry and take necessary action. (NB. This is not yet implemented!). - Invalidating an unused GTF_accept_transfer entry: 1. flags = ent->flags. 2. Observe that !(flags & GTF_transfer_committed). [*] 3. Check result of SMP-safe CMPXCHG(&ent->flags, flags, 0). NB. No need for WMB as reuse of entry is control-dependent on success of step 3, and all architectures guarantee ordering of ctrl-dep writes. [*] If GTF_transfer_committed is set then the grant entry is 'committed'. The guest must /not/ modify the grant entry until the address of the transferred frame is written. It is safe for the guest to spin waiting for this to occur (detect by observing GTF_transfer_completed in ent->flags). - Invalidating a committed GTF_accept_transfer entry: 1. Wait for (ent->flags & GTF_transfer_completed). - Changing a GTF_permit_access from writable to read-only: Use SMP-safe CMPXCHG to set GTF_readonly, while checking !GTF_writing. - Changing a GTF_permit_access from read-only to writable: Use SMP-safe bit-setting instruction. *evtchn Event Channels the event of interest is signalled by transitioning this bit from 0 to 1. guests must check the value of the bit after re-enabling event delivery to ensure no missed notifications. Linux source: driver/xen/evtchn.c Linux source: driver/xen/gntdev.c Linux source: driver/xen/gntalloc.c Linux source: driver/xen/privcmd.c HYPERCALL2(xen_version) = HYPERVISOR_xen_version HYPERCALL3(console_io); HYPERCALL3(grant_table_op); HYPERCALL2(sched_op); HYPERCALL2(event_channel_op); HYPERCALL2(hvm_op); HYPERCALL2(memory_op); HYPERCALL2(physdev_op); HYPERCALL3(vcpu_op); HYPERCALL1(tmem_op); HYPERCALL1(platform_op_raw); HYPERCALL2(multicall); HYPERCALL2(vm_assist); HYPERCALL3(dm_op); Source: driver/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c Source: driver/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c
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